Administrative Appeal Decision - Schmidt, Michael (2019-05-10) by unknown
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions Parole Administrative Appeal Documents 
December 2020 
Administrative Appeal Decision - Schmidt, Michael (2019-05-10) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad 
Recommended Citation 
"Administrative Appeal Decision - Schmidt, Michael (2019-05-10) 2019-05-10" (2020). Parole Information 
Project 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad/322 
This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Parole Administrative Appeal Documents 
at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Parole 
Administrative Appeal Decisions by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of 
Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
STATE OF NEW YORK-BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Schmidt, Michael Facility: Collins CF 
DIN: 18-A-1742 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
Appearances: Charles J. Greenberg, Esq. 
3 840 East Robinson Rd. #318 
Amherst, New York 14228 · 
07-185-18 B 
Decision appealed: June 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 15 months. 
Board Member(s) Alexander, Agostini, Shapiro 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived February 20, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation . . 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument. 
Final Determination: The widersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
~r ~firm~d _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
~ed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination.!!!!!§! be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ~te :findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ~/p .. i_.19 6 6 . 
, f ~ 
Distribution: Appeals Unit-Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2Q02(B) (11/2018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
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Appellant challenges the June 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 15-month hold. 
 Appellant is serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 1 to 3 years after having 
been convicted by plea to Criminal Contempt 1st.  Appellant has an extensive criminal history.  
Appellant shoved and strangled his female victim in violation of the terms of an order of protection. 
Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary, 
capricious, irrational, and made in violation of applicable legal authority; (2) the Board did not 
provide sufficient weight to Appellant’s programming, family support, release plans, and that he 
has “no notable disciplinary issues”; (3) the Board failed to prepare a Transitional Accountability 
Plan (TAP); (4) the COMPAS instrument may have contained erroneous information; (5) certain 
issues were not discussed during the interview; (6) the Board’s decision was made in violation of 
Appellant’s due process rights; (7) the Board’s decision was tantamount to a resentencing of 
Appellant; (8) the 15-month hold was excessive; (9) the Board’s decision was predetermined; and 
(10) Appellant is entitled to parole release based upon comparison with the circumstances of other 
inmates. 
As to the first and second issues, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely 
as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering 
if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will 
not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law 
§259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  “Although these standards are no longer 
repeated in the [Board’s] regulation, this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their 
application.”  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  A conclusion that an inmate fails 
to satisfy any one of the considerations set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) is an 
independent basis to deny parole.  See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268; Matter 
of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).    
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to 
the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal 
behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to 
parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477.  Thus, it is well 
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settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, 
e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter 
of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 
235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each 
factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 
A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17.  In 
the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it 
must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 
914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 
A.D.2d 128. 
As to the third issue, Correction Law §71-a requires DOCCS to prepare a Transitional 
Accountably Plan (now known as an “Offender Case Plan”) for inmates in the Department’s 
custody based on their programming and treatment needs.  In making parole release decisions, the 
Board must consider the most current case plan that may have been prepared by DOCCS. 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.2(b).  An Offender Case Plan was prepared for Appellant and made available to 
the Board at the time of the interview. See also Matter of Alymer v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
Index No. 218-16, Decision & Order dated Dec. 13, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (McGrath J.S.C.) 
(inmate’s case plan met requirement of TAP in accordance with Correction Law 71-a). 
            As to the fourth and fifth issues, Appellant was provided the opportunity to discuss with 
the Board during the interview any issues of interest, and cannot now be heard to complain that 
certain issues were not discussed, or the extent to which certain issues were discussed. See Matter 
of Serna v. New York State Division of Parole, 279 A.D.2d 684, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 166  (3d Dept. 
2001); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st
Dept. 1997).   
As to the sixth issue, an inmate has no Constitutional right to be released on parole before 
expiration of a valid sentence because a person's liberty interest is extinguished upon conviction. 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 
2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of 
Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The New York State 
parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected 
liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 
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N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
As to the seventh issue, Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to 
an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to 
determine the propriety of release per Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the 
factors set forth therein. See Executive Law §259 et seq.; Penal Law §70.40; Matter of Murray v. 
Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State 
Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  
Appellant has not in any manner been resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
As to the eighth issue, the Board has discretion to hold an inmate for a period of up to 24 
months. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b); Matter of Tatta v. State of 
N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 
604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 
(3d Dept. 2013).  Therefore, the hold of 15 months was not excessive or improper. 
As to the ninth issue, there is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to judges 
and administrative fact-finders. See People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 
A.D.2d 914 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to have followed applicable statutory 
requirements and internal policies when making decisions regarding the suitability of an inmate’s 
possible release to parole supervision. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000).  There is no evidence 
that the Board’s decision was predetermined.  See Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 
A.D.2d 899 (3d Dept. 2000).   
As to the tenth issue, there is no entitlement to community supervision based upon 
comparison with the circumstances of other inmates, as each case is sui generis, and the Board has 
full authority in each instance to give the various factors a unique weighted value. Phillips v. 
Dennison, 41 A.D. 3d 17 (1st Dept. 2007). 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
